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Fostering a Right to Maintenance Payments: The Privately Enforceable Right of Foster Care 





 Before the Child Welfare Act was introduced in 1980, Senator Cranston stated: 
“One of the prime weaknesses of our existing foster care system is that, once a child enters the 
system and remains in it for even a few months, the child is likely to become 'lost' in the system. 
. . . Foster care, with a few exceptions, should be a temporary placement; unfortunately, under 
our existing system, temporary foster care becomes a permanent solution for far too many 
children.”1  The history of the foster care system in the United States before the federal Child 
Welfare Act was implemented did not provide an incentive for states to help children exit the 
system and enter permanent homes.  The federal funding that was granted was limited, and 
children therefore suffered the consequences of a system that was not fully developed.  With the 
implementation of the Child Welfare Act in 1980, Congress made an effort to provide a 
comprehensive scheme that would incentivize states to create plans regarding how this federal 
funding was to be best utilized to benefit the children within the foster care system.2 
The program that is established within the Act provides the states with funding from the 
federal government, conditioned upon a plan approved by the Department of Health and Human 
Services.3  States are able to choose to comply with the Act’s conditions and requirements, or 
forgo federal funding.4  The Child Welfare Act requires participating states to reimburse foster 
 
1 125 CONG. REC. S22,684 (1979); "A Lost Generation": The Battle for Private Enforcement of the Adoption 
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 593, 597 n. 22. 
2 "A Lost Generation": The Battle for Private Enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 
1980, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 593, 610. 
3 Cal. State Foster Parent Ass'n v. Wagner, 624 F.3d 974, 978. 
4 D.O.v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 376. 
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parents for a list of enumerated costs using the federal funding.5  Under 42 U.S.C. section 672(a), 
“each State with a plan approved under this part shall make foster care maintenance payments on 
behalf of each child who has been removed from the home or a relative…”6  The plan’s approval 
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services is dependent on whether it satisfies thirty-five 
criteria, and if it is unable to pass muster under the requirements, the Secretary can give the state 
an opportunity to remedy its plan to meet the criterion.7 
However, an issue with the Act is the remedy that it provides. When the providers and 
foster care families are not receiving the benefits that they are entitled to under the provisions of 
the Child Welfare Act, they have no recourse available to them.  Raising a child is expensive, 
due to the cost of basic essentials like food, clothing, and shelter, without factoring in the even 
more costly payments associated with education, and everyday care and supervision.  Under the 
current structure of the Child Welfare Act, the remedy when states do not comply with the Act’s 
requirement of distribution of maintenance payments to individual providers is for the federal 
assistance to the state to be refused or eliminated.8  Therefore, providers are stripped of their 
funding and the ability to take care of the foster children within their homes.  A more effective 
measure would enable individual providers to sue the state for maintenance payments.  For this 
to occur, the court should find an individual private right to foster care maintenance payments 
that is enforceable under section 1983.  This comment analyzes whether Congress did intend to 
confer a new individual right within the Child Welfare Act, and whether that right could be 
protected by a section 1983 cause of action. 
 
5 Cal. State Foster Parent Ass'n, 624 F.3d at 978. 
6 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1). 
7 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 376. 
8 "A Lost Generation": The Battle for Private Enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 
1980, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 593, 611. 
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In 2012, Kentucky’s Health and Family Services commenced a proceeding against the 
mother of two young boys, who had stipulated that she had neglected her children.9  When the 
boys were placed in foster care, the mother’s aunt, R.O., sought custody so that the boys were 
not subjected to the foster care system.10  After the state conducted a home evaluation and 
criminal background check on R.O., the boys were placed into her home by Court Order.11  R.O. 
was granted joint custody by the family court to both the mother and the aunt in 2014, but the 
boys continued living with the aunt.12  R.O. filed a motion with the court seeking foster care 
maintenance payments.13 After the family court declined to rule on whether she could collect 
foster care maintenance payments, R.O. sued the Secretary for Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health 
and Family Services in state court for payments.14 She argued that “the federal Child Welfare 
Act required the state to provide maintenance payments, and that the failure to make payments 
violated the Constitution’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.”15  The Cabinet removed 
the case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss.16  The district court granted the Cabinet’s 
motion, and in their decision reasoned that because the Child Welfare Act did not provide any 
privately enforceable right, the court did not believe that R.O. was entitled to foster care 
maintenance payments.17  
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit in D.O. v. Glisson ruled that the Child Welfare Act conferred 
upon foster families a private right to these maintenance payments, and that the right was 
 










enforceable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.18  The court’s decision created a circuit split with the 
Eighth Circuit, which had previously held in Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Association v. 
Kincade, that foster care providers did not have a privately enforceable right of action to recover 
maintenance payments under the Child Welfare Act.19  The Sixth Circuit found that there was a 
private right of action that was enforceable under section 1983.20 The Sixth Circuit was correct in 
ruling, and this comment will analyze the importance of conferring such an individual private 
right enforceable under section 1983 to individual foster families and providers.  
Part II describes the History of the Child Welfare Act as well as 42 U.S.C. §1983. It 
discusses the Blessing test that is applied by the courts to determine whether there is an 
individual right intended by Congress. Part III demonstrates the differing interpretations of the 
Child Welfare Act by the Eighth Circuit versus the Sixth Circuit which created the circuit split. 
Part IV analyzes whether the Child Welfare Act creates an individually enforceable right to 
foster care maintenance payments. In doing so, Part IV argues that there is a Section 1983 cause 
of action against the states when providers do not receive appropriate funding. Part V concludes 
that an individually enforceable right is created and that providers have a Section 1983 cause of 
action against the states. 
II. History of the Child Welfare Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
 Part II will address the enactment of the Child Welfare Act. This section will address the 
qualifications that must be met by the states and providers to receive foster care maintenance 
payments. Additionally, Section II discusses a private right of action under section 1983 and how 
court’s have interpreted whether a private individual may enforce the remedies available.  
 
18 Id. at 377. 
19 Julianne Tobin Wojay, Federal Circuits Split Over Foster Parent Funding, THE UNITED STATES LAW WEEK, Feb. 
9, 2017, at 1, BLOOMBERG BNA, 85 U.S.L.W. 1051. 
20 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 376. 
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A. The Child Welfare Act 
Before the 1980 when the Child Welfare Act was enacted, Title IV-A of the Social 
Security was the main provider of federal financial assistance for children in foster care.21  The 
Child Welfare Act was legislation created through the Spending Clause to create a program that 
allowed for cooperation between the state and federal government to fund foster care and 
adoption programs.22  Typically, when a statute is enacted under the spending power, the typical 
remedy taken by the Federal Government is to terminate funds to the State.23  Under the Child 
Welfare Act, the federally funded programs included Part B of Title IV of the Social Security 
Act, colloquially known the Child Welfare Services Program.24 Additionally, Title IV-E of the 
Social Security Act, known as the Foster Care Maintenance Payments Program was also 
created.25  The funds that a state expends within the constraints set in the Act are eligible for 
partial reimbursement by the federal government.26  The program that is established within the 
Act whereby the federal government provides the states with funding, conditioned upon a plan 
approved by the Department of Health and Human Services.27  States are able to choose to 
comply with the Act’s conditions and requirements, or forgo federal funding.28  The Child 
Welfare Act requires participating states to reimburse foster parents for a list of enumerated costs 
using the federal funding.29  
 
21 Julianne Tobin Wojay, Federal Circuits Split Over Foster Parent Funding, THE UNITED STATES LAW WEEK, Feb. 
9, 2017, at 1, BLOOMBERG BNA, 85 U.S.L.W. 1051. 
22 Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass’n v. Kincade, 712 F.3d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir.); Cal. State Foster Parent Ass'n 
v. Wagner, 624 F.3d 974, 978. 
23 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280. 
24 Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s Burden Under Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 
B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 259, 267. 
25 Id. 
26 Midwest Foster Care, 712 F.3d at 1194. 
27 Cal. State Foster Parent Ass'n, 624 F.3d at 978. 
28 D.O.v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 376. 
29 Cal. State Foster Parent Ass'n, 624 F.3d at 978. 
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Under 42 U.S.C. section 672(a), “each State with a plan approved under this part shall 
make foster care maintenance payments on behalf of each child who has been removed from the 
home or a relative…”30  The plan’s approval by the Secretary of Health and Human Services is 
dependent on whether it satisfies thirty-five criteria, and if it is unable to pass muster under the 
requirements, the Secretary can give the state an opportunity to remedy its plan to meet the 
criterion.31  If the plan still fails to “substantially conform,”32 the federal government will not 
provide funding for the program.33  Within section 671(a)(1), a requirement of each plan is that it 
“provide for foster care maintenance payments in accordance with section 672.”34 Foster care 
maintenance payments are defined in section 675(4)(A) as meaning “payments to cover the cost 
of (and the cost of providing) food, clothing, shelter, daily supervision, school supplies, a child's 
personal incidentals, liability insurance with respect to a child, reasonable travel to the child's 
home for visitation, and reasonable travel for the child to remain in the school in which the child 
is enrolled at the time of placement.”35  The payments are made only “on behalf of a child” that 
is eligible under the standard of section 672(a), which requires that the removal and foster care 
placement requirements are met and the child would have qualified for assistance under the Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children program.36  
The Act additionally sets out other qualifications in section 672(b) that further limit who 
is eligible to receive these payments, specifying that a child must be either in a foster family 
home of an individual or in a private or public child-care institution.37  In defining those terms 
 
30 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1). 
31 Glisson, 847 F.3d at 376. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass’n v. Kincade, 712 F.3d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir.) 
35 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(A). 
36 Midwest Foster Care, 712 F.3d at 1194-95. 
37 42 U.S.C. § 672(b). 
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for purposes of the Act, section 672(c) defines a “foster family home” as licensed by the State or 
approved to have met the requirements by the State agency with authority to license.38 Further, 
“child-care institution” is regarded as a public or private institution with a maximum of twenty-
five children, that is also licensed by the State or approved to have met the standard of such an 
institution by the State agency with authority to license.39 
Under U.S.C. 674(a)(1), the State is then entitled to partial matching reimbursement from 
the federal government after paying out maintenance payments.40  Within the statute, it provides 
that “each State which has a plan approved under this part shall be entitled to a payment equal to 
the sum of…. an amount equal to the Federal medical assistance percentage… of the total 
number expended during such quarter as foster care maintenance payments under section 672 of 
this title for children in foster family homes or child-care institutions.”41  The Child Welfare Act 
grants or denies foster care maintenance payments to States based on whether their plan qualifies 
under the Act. 
B. 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 is relevant to determine whether an individual foster care 
provider has a private right of action against the state under the Child Welfare Act. If a federal 
right has been created by the Act, then Section 1983 would allow individuals to enforce their 
right to maintenance payments.  
Section 1983 states “every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State…subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States…to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
 
38 42 U.S.C. § 672(c). 
39 Id. 
40 D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 377; Midwest Foster Care, 712 F.3d at 1195. 
41 42 U.S.C.S. § 674(a)(1). 
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laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress…”42  This section allows private individuals to establish a cause of action 
if they were intended beneficiaries of federal legislation.43  Section 1983 simply provides a 
procedure to enforce these individual rights, not the rights themselves.44  Section 1983 does not 
speak in terms of violations of federal law, but rather the deprivation of rights, privileges or 
immunities guaranteed by the Constitution, and therefore, a federal right must be created by the 
statute in question.45  The understanding of section 1983 is specifically to enforce rights, and not 
the broader understanding of possible “benefits” or “interests” that an individual may assert.46  
Private citizens are able to enforce these remedies, unless one of two circumstances exists.47  If 
“the statute [does] not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of 
section 1983,” then the remedies of section 1983 are not enforceable.48  Therefore, the creation 
of a private right within the statute is crucial. 
Additionally, private individuals may not enforce these remedies if within the statute 
itself, Congress has “foreclosed enforcement” under section 1983.49  Congress has the ability to 
either expressly forbid an individual’s recourse under section 1983, or may do so implicitly.50  If 
the statute contains a remedial scheme that is “sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate a 
congressional intent to withdraw the private remedy of 1983,” then Congress has implicitly 
foreclosed enforcement under 1983.51  The difficult showing must be made that the scheme that 
 
42 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983. 
43 "A Lost Generation": The Battle for Private Enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 
1980, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 593, 611. 
44 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284. 
45 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 511. 
46 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283. 
47 Id. 
48 “A Lost Generation” at 611-12 (citing Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n at 508). 
49 Id. 
50 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341. 
51 Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 521. 
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Congress has implemented within the statute would be inconsistent with allowing a section 1983 
action.52  Where Congress has foreclosed, a dismissal of the case would be appropriate.53   
The inquiry of whether a remedy is available under section 1983 begins with whether a 
private right was intended by Congress upon creation of the statute.  When determining whether 
a particular statutory provision gives right to a federal right, the Court has looked at three factors 
established in Blessing v. Freestone.54  Before beginning the analysis through the three-part test 
of Blessing, the Court requires that the specific provision that creates individual rights be 
identified, rather analyzing the Act in its entirety.55  The first factor to be considered is “whether 
Congress intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff.”56  In this inquiry, the 
Court looks to the determine whether the statute has an “individual entitlement” that is 
“unambiguously conferred” but the use of “rights-creating language.”57  Specifically, the 
language of the statute must be “phrased in terms of the persons benefitted.”58 Second, it must be 
demonstrated by plaintiff that the asserted right is not so “vague and amorphous that its 
enforcement would strain judicial competence.”59  Finally, the statute in question “must 
unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States.”60  This final element has been 
interpreted as meaning that the statute in question must contain “mandatory rather than precatory 
terms.”61  
 
52 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 346. 
53 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521. 
54 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340. 
55 Cal. State Foster Parent Ass'n v. Wagner, 624 F.3d 974, 979. 
56 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340. 
57 Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 461. 
58 Id. 
59 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340. 
60 Id. at 341. 
61 Id. 
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Under this analysis, the courts have made it abundantly clear that Congress’s intent must 
be unambiguous within the statute to confer individual rights.62  Due to the court’s emphasis on 
congressional intent, if a plaintiff can demonstrate that the statute creates an individually 
enforceable right under section 1983, there is only a rebuttable presumption created.63  In 
ascertaining congressional intent, evidence may be drawn directly from the statute itself or 
“inferred from the statute’s creation of a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is 
incompatible with individual enforcement under [section] 1983.”64  In sum, the courts apply the 
Blessing test to determine whether there is a private right of action conferred upon individuals 
under Section 1983.  
III. The Interpretation of the Child Welfare Act Created a Circuit Split Between the Eighth and 
Sixth Circuits 
 
A. The Eighth Circuit Rules that there is No Congressional Intent of a Privately 
Enforceable Right Within the Child Welfare Act.  
 
Courts have struggled with the question of whether there is Congressional intent to confer 
foster care maintenance payments under the Child Welfare Act. The Eighth Circuit has 
concluded that Congress did not intend to create a privately enforceable right to foster care 
maintenance payments within the Child Welfare Act. In Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass'n 
v. Kincade, a case was brought by six individual foster care providers and two organizations 
representing Missouri foster care providers against Missouri state officials who implement the 
foster care program within the state.65  The collective group of providers claimed in their 
complaint that the Child Welfare Act of 1980 gave them a privately enforceable right under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 to receive foster care maintenance payments enumerated in the Child Welfare 
 
62 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280. 
63 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341; see also Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 461. 
64 D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 372, 380. 
65 Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass'n v. Kincade, 712 F.3d 1190, 1193-94. 
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Act.66  The State of Missouri argued that the provision of the Child Welfare Act should be 
interpreted to constrain who is to receive the funding and provide an enumerated list of types of 
expenses that the government should have to provide matching funding for.67  In opposition, the 
providers argue that the correct understanding of section 672(a) grants eligible foster care entities 
with an individually enforceable right through section 1983 to payments sufficient to cover the 
enumerated list in section 675(4)(A) defining foster care maintenance payments.68 
In its decision, the Court noted that under the first prong of the test established in 
Blessing, Congress must have intended the statutory provision at issue to specifically benefit the 
plaintiff.69 The Court clarified that in analyzing the provision under the first prong of the test, 
there must be an “unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action under section 
1983.70 The Court reviewed the existence of a federally enforceable right by looking to the three 
factors considered in Gonzaga under the first prong of the Blessing test. The Court looked for 
rights-creating language in terms of the individual persons benefitted, manifestation of an 
individual focus rather than an aggregate one, and whether Congress provided a federal review 
mechanism within the statute.71 
Under the first factor, the Court determined that there was no rights creating language 
within the statute.72 As a finding, the Court determined that “where the statutory language 
primarily concerns itself with commanding how states are to function within a federal program, 
 
66 Id. at 1193. 




71 Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass'n v. Kincade, 712 F.3d 1190, 1196-97. 
72 Id. at 1197. 
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the statute is less likely to have created an individually enforceable right.”73 The Court reasoned 
that the focus was a limitation on the expenditures of the state that would be matched, rather than 
on the interests of the providers.74  The Child Welfare Act was interpreted by the Court to regard 
the states as “regulated participants in the CWA” and was not phrased in terms of the states as 
beneficiaries of the Act.75  In finding that the language of the statute was not “phrased in terms of 
the persons benefitted”, the Court stated that the language was necessary so that section 1983 
enforcement was only available to alleged violations of federal rights, rather than simply 
violations of federal law.76  The finding of a connection between section 1983 plaintiffs and a 
benefit by the statute is necessary, but not sufficient to create a private right.77 
In considering the second prong of the Blessing test, the Court looked to whether the 
statute had an individual focus, thus giving rise to individual rights.78 An aggregate focus within 
the statute does not give rise to individual rights.79 The Court stated that “when a statute links 
funding to substantial compliance with its conditions—including forming and adhering to a state 
plan with specified features—this counsels against the creation of individually enforceable 
rights.”80 This is because in creating a compliance scheme within a statute, even when the state 
complies with its responsibilities to receive federal funding, individual beneficiaries may still not 
receive the full spectrum of benefits offered within the statute.81 Here, the Court focused on the 
 
73 Id. at 1199. 
74 Id. at 1197. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass'n v. Kincade, 712 F.3d 1190, 1199. 
78 Id. at 1197. 
79 Id. at 1199. 
80 Id. at 1197. 
81 Id. at 1200-01. 
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substantial compliance element within the statute, and determined that the statute was not 
concerned with whether the needs of one particular foster care facility were satisfied.82   
Additionally, the Court stated that another indication that the statute was not individually 
focused where “each…. reference to [the asserted individual right] is in the context of describing 
the type of [action] that triggers a funding prohibition.”83  In the language of the Child Welfare 
Act, if the state fails to meet the enumerated requirements when creating their plan regarding 
foster care maintenance payments, they are denied funding by the federal government.84 
Although the funding prohibition is not explicitly stated, the effect of not complying with the 
Act’s requirements is just that: a funding prohibition.85 The court notes that it has never found 
individually enforceable rights where the statute has referenced a restriction of funding.86 
Finally, the Court looked to the final prong of the Blessing test, which establishes that 
where the statute provides for a “federal review mechanism” within the statute , its existence cuts 
against the inference that Congress intended to create an individual right enforceable under 
section 1983.87  Under the Child Welfare Act, oversight regarding the funding restrictions is 
provided by the Secretary of Health and Human Services for states that choose to participate in 
the program.88  But even with this procedure in place, the Court stated that a direct federal 
review of the claims of statutory violations made by individual providers does not exist within 
 
82 Id. at 1201. 
83 Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass'n v. Kincade, 712 F.3d 1190, 1201 (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288-89). 
84 Id. at 1202. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 1201. 
87 Id. at 1202. 
88 Id. 
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the Act.89  Instead, the claims are delegated to the individual states to deal with and federal 
review is explicitly limited.90 
In its conclusion, the Court reasoned that although there was no federal reviewing 
mechanism for individuals, the other factors considered under the first prong of the Blessing test 
swayed towards there being no congressional intent to create an individually enforceable right 
under the Child Welfare Act.91  Rejecting the argument that it was sufficient to overcome the 
other factors due to the finding that there was no federal review instrument in place, the court 
reasoned that it did not need to analyze the remaining prongs of the Blessing test since it could 
not be established that there was unambiguous congressional intent.92 The court held that 
Congress did not confer such a right, and therefore affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the 
complaint for failure to state a claim .93 
B. The Sixth Circuit -- the CWA Confers a Privately Enforceable Right Under Section 
1983. 
 
Nevertheless, not all Circuits have been persuaded by the Eighth’s Circuit’s ruling that 
Congress did not intend to create a private right of action. In contrast, in the Sixth Circuit, the 
aunt of two boys placed in foster care sued the Security for  Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and 
Family Services for foster care maintenance payments.94  She argued that the federal Child 
Welfare Act created an enforceable private right to these payments, and failure of the state to 
make them violated Equal Protection and Due Process of the United States Constitution.95 The 
 
89 Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass'n v. Kincade, 712 F.3d 1190, 1202. 




94 D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 376. 
95 Id. 
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district court dismissed the case, and reasoned that Act did not provide any privately enforceable 
rights that could be enforced by section 1983.96 
 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit looked to three relevant sections of the Child Welfare Act to 
determine whether there was a privately enforceable right.97 First, the court looked at section 
671(a), which provides that a state must submit a plan to the Secretary to be eligible for federal 
funding. Next, the Court stated that the plan must conform to the requirements within section 
672 of the Act, stating that “[e]ach State with a plan approved under this part shall make foster 
care maintenance payments on behalf of each child who has been removed from the home of a 
relative… into foster care.”98 Foster care maintenance payments are defined in an enumerated list 
in section 675(4)(A) of the Act, and cover the cost of shelter, food, and clothing, in addition to 
other crucial costs accrued.99  The final provision of the Act considered in the case at hand was 
regarding when states may seek reimbursement from the federal government for maintenance 
payments made to foster families.100  Section 674(a)(1) states that states are eligible for an 
“amount equal to the Federal medical assistance percentage… of the total amount expended 
during such quarter as foster care maintenance payments under section 672” for children under 
the care of foster homes or child-care institutions as defined by the statute.101 
The Court considered the same factors established in the Blessing test to find whether 
there was an individually enforceable right.102 First, the Court found that the Act’s language 
mandating payments “on behalf of each child” focused on the benefits to individual recipients, 
 
96 Id.  
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 370. 
99 Id. at 377. 
100 D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 377. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 376. 
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rather than simply speaking to the implementation of the policy on the state.103 Under the first 
prong of the Blessing test, the Court reasoned that the Act requiring individual payments focused 
on the needs of the individual children within the foster care system, rather than an aggregate 
focus, which would not give rise to an individually enforceable right.104 
In addition, section 675(4)(A) of the Act has a specific list of expenses that the 
maintenance payments must cover, and therefore the Court determined that there were no “vague 
and amorphous” terms that would strain the judiciary’s interpretation.105  The State argues that 
because the specific amounts that the State is required to pay are not quantified within the 
statute, the Child Welfare Act is not specific enough and therefore is not enforceable under 
section 1983.106  But the Court provides that because there is a reasonable methodology that the 
State has established in calculating foster care maintenance payments, the statute is not deemed 
to be unenforceable for being indefinite.107  Giving the state’s discretion in establishing what the 
rates were does not mean that there is no recognizable private right to a monetary benefits under 
the Act.108 
Under the final prong of the Blessing test, the Court found that the language of section 
672(a)(1) stating that the state “shall make foster care maintenance payments” imposed an 
obligation on the states because it was phrased in mandatory terms.109  The Court notes that if 
Congress had wanted the Act to “serve as a roadmap for the conditions a state must fulfill in 
order for its expenditure to be eligible for federal matching funds” like the State argued, it would 
 
103 Id. at 378. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 379. 
107 Id. at 379-80. 
108 Id. at 379. 
109 Id. at 378. 
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not have chosen to frame the statute in mandatory terms.110  Simply put, the Court stated that 
payment by the states under the Child Welfare Act “isn’t optional.”111  The State argued that the 
Act speaks to the states as participants within the construct of the Act by referring to the state as 
the subject.112  Rejecting the State’s argument, the Court concluded that the Supreme Court and 
the Sixth Circuit have both affirmed that laws phrased in the active voice where the state is the 
subject have previously been found to confer individual rights, like in Harris and Wilder.113   
Noting that under the third prong of the Blessing test, Congress must “impose a binding 
obligation on the States” with the language of the statute, the court concluded that the Child 
Welfare Act requires a mandatory action on the part of the states.114  In conclusion, the Court 
established that under the Blessing test, section 672(a) of the Child Welfare Act conferred an 
individual enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments.115   
Under the analysis of Blessing, the creation of a private right only establishes a rebuttable 
presumption that the right can be enforced under section 1983, and therefore the court had to 
determine whether Congress intended for the statute to create such a private right.116  To 
determine whether the congressional intent exists, the court can look directly to the provision of 
the statute, or it can also be inferred from Congress’s creation of an enforcement scheme within 
the statute that would be inconsistent with an individual’s right to enforce under section 1983.117 




112 D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 379. 
113 Id.; see also Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502-03; see e.g. Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 461-
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individual’s access to section 1983 remedies.118  Specifically, the Act requires that a state 
establish a plan, but there is no process established within the Act that a foster care provider 
could use to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Child Welfare Act if the state 
completely neglects to pay foster care maintenance payments.119 The Court concluded that the 
Child Welfare Act did not include any private federal review mechanism that a foster family 
could employ when they were denied payments required under the Act.120  Therefore, the Court 
held that the Child Welfare Act did confer upon foster families and providers an individual right 
to maintenance payments that was enforceable under section 1983.121  
To recap, the Eighth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have analyzed the same question 
regarding whether the Child Welfare Act confers a private right of action but have reached 
opposite conclusions. Part IV examines the policy implications of these decisions and 
demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the Child Welfare Act is not only correct 
as a matter of interpretation, but also to further foster children’s interests throughout the United 
States. 
IV. The Child Welfare Act and Section 1983 Create an Individually 
 
A. The Court Has Established a Private Right in Act’s with Similar Language.  
 
Where an Act has contained similar language to that of the Child Welfare Act, the courts 
have found that an individually enforceable right has been created. Throughout the United States, 
courts have applied the Blessing test to determine what creates an individually enforceable right. 
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the court found that using the phrase “any individual eligible for medical assistance” within the 
statute used terminology that was individually focused enough to “unambiguously confer an 
individual entitlement.”123  The court concluded that the provision was intended specifically with 
its beneficiaries in mind, and therefore the plaintiff was intended to benefit from the Medicaid 
provision at issue.124   
In juxtaposition, the language at issue in Gonzaga states: “No funds shall be made 
available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a 
policy or practice of permitting the release of educations records (or personally identifiable 
information contained therein…) of students without the written consent of their parents to any 
individual, agency or organization.”125  The court held in this case that the statute did not grant 
any individual right because of the lack of rights-creating language within the statute that would 
have given rise to Congress’s intent to create new rights.126  Rather than speaking in terms of an 
individual right of the students, the Act spoke in terms of the institution that the Act sought to 
govern.  The language of the statute clearly does not speak in terms of any individual to be 
benefitted, and focused rather on the “institutional policy and practice” that is to be regulated by 
the statute.127 
In section 672(a), the Child Welfare Act specifically focuses on the individual foster care 
providers that are intended to be protected by the statute. By stating that the state makes foster 
care payments “on behalf of each child,” the statute is focused on payment to the providers, who 
in turn are benefitting the children protected by the Act. The statute is not focused on the 
 
123 Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 461 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287). 
124 Id. at 461-62. 
125 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)). 
126 D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 378. 
127 Cal. State Foster Parent Ass'n v. Wagner, 624 F.3d 974, 980 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 
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institutions regulated, but rather the actual individuals that are meant to be protected by requiring 
distribution of foster care maintenance payments. Distinct from the statute in Gonzaga, there is 
no aggregate focus on the institution as a whole here. Instead, Congress was focused on the 
situations of the individual providers.128 Additionally, the inclusion of the term “each” 
emphasizes an individual focus on the specific children within the system. The statute designates 
that the foster care providers are to receive these maintenance payments “on behalf of each 
child”, and this specific language is directed at providers and is to be interpreted by the court to 
benefit the individual foster parents and providers. 
 Second, it must be demonstrated by the plaintiff that the right protected within the statute 
is not so “vague and amorphous” that enforcing it would “strain judicial competence.”129  Where 
the statute is not definitive and specific, the Court can declare that it would not qualify under 
section 1983 enforcement.  It cannot be understood that Congress would have intended to confer 
a right where it would be too difficult for the judiciary to enforce. But, the court has declared that 
a statute cannot be declared to be unenforceable in “the absence of a uniform federal 
methodology for setting rates.”130   
Under section 675(4)(A), the specific definition of what constitutes a “foster care 
maintenance payment” is enumerated with an itemized list of what that state is required to cover 
under the Act.131 Congress specifically listed certain necessities that it deemed were necessary to 
be covered by the foster care maintenance payments, including “food, clothing, shelter, daily 
supervision, school supplies, a child’s personal incidentals, liability insurance with respect to a 
child, reasonable travel to the child’s home for visitation, and reasonable travel for the child to 
 
128 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 279. 
129 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,  340-41. 
130 Cal. State Foster Parent Ass'n, 624 F.3d at 981 (quoting Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 518-19). 
131 Reply Br. for Pet. at 5, Glisson v. D.O., 847 F.3d 374 (2017) (No. 17-17). 
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remain in the school in which the child is enrolled at the time of placement.”132 With this 
extremely explicit list recited within the statute, there is no way that the provision at issue could 
be interpreted as ambiguous in regards to what payments are to be made on behalf of each child. 
Additionally, there is discretion allotted for the states to choose the reasonable method of how to 
calculate the rates of the maintenance payments.133  Simply because the amounts paid out to 
foster parents is not specifically stated within the Act does not threaten enforcement by the 
judiciary.134 As long as the state has a plan that fits the requirements of the Act, the court is still 
able to implement a standard to assess whether the state is in compliance with the statute. As a 
result, there is no way that the enforcement of the identified right would strain the Court’s ability 
to enforce the right under section 1983. 
Finally, the Blessing analysis requires that the statute unambiguously create a binding 
obligation on the States with mandatory language.135  Within the statute at issue in Harris, it 
stated that “[a] State plan… must… provide.”136  The court deemed that this language 
established Congress’s intent to phrase the statute in terms of binding language, rather than 
simply advising the states of their obligations under the statute.137  Additionally, in Price, the 
court deemed an almost completely analogous provision to contain mandatory language that 
satisfied the final prong of the test. Both provisions within the statute require that the grantee 
states of the federal funding make payments to individuals who were intended to benefit from the 
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Act.138 As the court stated in D.O., if Congress had intended for the statute to simply be a 
“roadmap” that the states could follow, then it would not have used mandatory terminology to 
dictate what the states must do in order to receive funding.139  Congress in its creation of laws 
and legislation knows how to frame a statute in non-binding terms. If reading the statute in the 
manner that Congress intended, it must be interpreted as a mandatory obligation placed upon the 
states. In stating that “[e]ach State with a plan approved… shall make foster care maintenance 
payments…” Congress used mandatory language by using “shall” to describe the state’s 
obligation under the Act in regards to payments.140  Congress also intentionally used the active 
voice in describing what the state must do to receive funding to make the obligation obviously 
mandatory on the States.  
In conclusion, it must be interpreted that the Child Welfare Act was meant to be confer 
an individually enforceable right to providers and individual foster families. 
B. Congress Did Intend an Individual Right Enforceable under Section 1983. 
When interpreting the Child Welfare Act, a private individual right must be conferred. When 
it is established that there is a privately enforceable individual right in the statute,  
the analysis is not concluded. Because the focus within the provision is on the congressional 
intent to determine whether it produces a federal right, there is only a rebuttable presumption that 
the right is enforceable under section 1983.141  Evidence of congressional intent can be drawn 
directly from the language of the statute that created the right.142  In the case of Gonzaga, the 
 
138 Price v. City of Stockton, 390 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2004); compare 42 U.S.C. § 672(a) (“[e]ach State with a 
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State found that Congress expressly stated that the Secretary of Education was to “deal with 
violations” of the Act, and provided an explicit framework.143  The court found that the statute 
established a mechanism that Congress provided to remedy violations of the Act.144 Therefore, 
enforcement under section 1983 was not necessary for an individual to remedy their situation.145  
In contrast, Within the language of the Child Welfare Act, there is no explicit statement of 
Congress’s intent to expressly foreclose an individual’s access to a section 1983 cause of action. 
No language exists to determine what action is to be taken by an individual if the state does not 
abide by its plan in compliance with the Child Welfare Act. 
Where the remedy is not explicitly renounced, congressional intent can still be 
inferred.146  If the statute creates a scheme that is “sufficiently comprehensive”, the Court has 
concluded that it is sufficient to infer Congress’s intent to disallow a remedy under section 
1983.147 The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that having a provision establishing an 
ability to reduce or terminate funding when states do not comply with the statute is sufficient to 
find that Congress has foreclosed access to a section 1983 remedy.148  
  A showing must be made that enforcement of an action under section 1983 would be 
wholly inconsistent with the scheme that Congress has implemented within the statute.149  As of 
the case of Blessing v. Freestone, the Court had only find two schemes sufficiently 
comprehensive to oust enforcement under section 1983.150  Where the Court found that a federal 
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statute had the congressional intent to foreclose, the remedial scheme was much more 
comprehensive than the one established in the Child Welfare Act.151  Here, the Act does not 
establish any private judicial enforcement within its provisions that would allow an individual to 
enforce the right to foster care maintenance payments. The Child Welfare Act provides no 
administrative means that would allow a provider to ask the state to make payments that they 
have not been granted.152 Therefore, the Act should not be viewed as foreclosing access to 
section 1983 enforcement. 
Within the Child Welfare Act, there is no remedial scheme that would be inconsistent 
with section 1983 enforcement. Section 1983 is intended to allow private individuals to establish 
a cause of action if they were intended to be beneficiaries of federal legislation.153  There is no 
remedy that is afforded to foster parents and institutions intended to benefit from the Act that 
would allow for them to ensure foster maintenance payments are made. The Secretary only 
reviews the states plans for compliance with the Act, but they do not have the authority to 
actually make sure that the states provide the individual foster caretakers with the benefits 
guaranteed by the Act.154  In essence, the states could implement a plan that conforms to the 
federal requirements and be approved by the Secretary, and yet never make payments to foster 
care providers.155  
Therefore, the court must interpret Congress’s intent to provide an individually 
enforceable right under section 1983. 
C. Policy Implications Call for the Child Welfare Act to Confer an Individual Right to 
Foster Care Maintenance Payments Enforceable under Section 1983. 
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The Child Welfare Act is a huge move forward in the reform of the foster care system. 
Prior to the implementation of the Act, foster families caring for children were only granted 
financial assistance if they qualified for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 
which stringently limited which children were eligible for federal funding.156  For example, 
federal assistance was given to states strictly for foster care, and not for adoption, which 
removed the incentive for states to place children into adoptive homes because of the risk of a 
loss of funding.157  As a result, the children within the system were  forced to stay in foster 
homes for much longer periods than anticipated, which would result in a greater likelihood that 
the child would be “lost” within the system.158  Before 1980 when the Act was passed, the Social 
Security Act provided funding for a larger range of services than what was actually used in 
practice.159  In practice, Congress devoted a maximum of $56.6 million, although around $266 
million was authorized for Title IV-B use.160 
With the establishment of the Child Welfare Act in 1980, states are given the incentive of 
receiving federal funding for their compliance with the Act. This motivation to create plans that 
comply with the Act in turn enables states to fund foster care and adoption assistance services.161 
By implementing these plans, the foster care systems throughout the states are much more 
comprehensive than they were prior to the Act’s implementation in 1980. As a result of state 
funding being conditioned upon established plans that must be approved by the Department of 
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Health and Human Services, the Child Welfare Act is clearly a comprehensive endeavor by 
Congress to improve the foster care system.162 
But, the system created within the Act is not without its flaws, particularly if the Court 
does not find that there is a privately enforceable right to maintenance payments under section 
1983. When states do not comply with the Act, their federal funding will be either reduced or 
eliminated.163  Under section 1320a-2a, the Secretary is granted the right to determine whether 
the states plan “substantially conforms” with the federal requirements.164  If the plan is 
determined to not conform, then the Secretary is not simply given the power, but is required to 
withhold federal funding.165 Within the language of the Act, there is no other recourse available 
to remedy the situation for individuals.166  As a result, when the states do not comply with the 
requirements within the Act, the individual foster families and child care providers suffer the loss 
of federal funding without any ability to remedy their situations. The individuals that are 
intended to be benefitted by the maintenance payments are therefore hurt by the cutting off of 
federal assistance. By permitting the use of a section 1983 claim of action for maintenance 
payments, the children within the foster care system and the individuals who cares for them are 
not deprived of the ability to purchase basic necessities, such as clothing and food. 
V. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the correct interpretation of the Child Welfare Act of 1980 is the Sixth 
Circuit’s understanding in D.O. v. Glisson.  The Act does create an individually enforceable right 
to foster care maintenance payments for an individual foster care family and foster care provider 
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as defined under the statute.  The language of the Child Welfare Act created by Congress confers 
a right due to its mandatory language within the statute, as well as the binding obligation 
imposed on the states, who are granted reasonable deference in establishing the exact rate at 
which these payments are distributed.  
Due to the Child Welfare Act conferring a right to individuals, the next step in the 
analysis is considering whether enforcement under section 1983 is appropriate. Once a plaintiff 
demonstrates that a statute creates a privately enforceable right, there is only a rebuttable 
presumption that the right is therefore enforceable under section 1983. Evidence of congressional 
intent is important to show that Congress either did or did not intend access to a section 1983 
remedy upon creation of the new right within the statute. Evidence can be found either explicitly 
within the statute itself, or it can be inferred from the creation of a sufficiently comprehensive 
scheme that would make enforcement under section 1983 incompatible with the statute.  
In the Child Welfare Act, there is no explicit access to a remedy for non-payment of 
foster care maintenance payments.  Individual providers and foster care families do not have any 
explicit right within the statute to remedy a situation where they do not receive funds that they 
are entitled to under the Act.  
Additionally, the scheme within the statute does not sufficiently preclude an individual 
from seeking enforcement through section 1983. There is no explicit process through which 
individuals are able to seek benefits that they are not provided for. Providers are not given any 
framework that they are able to follow to seek monetary relief from the state when maintenance 
payments are not distributed to enable them to cover the costs of the children placed within their 
home or institution.  The Child Welfare Act’s mechanisms to enforce the right to these foster 
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care maintenance payments do not sufficiently foreclose an individual’s access to section 1983 
remedies. 
Although the foster care system has taken steps forward since the implementation of the 
Child Welfare Act in 1980, there still must be a remedy available for those that are not granted 
federally funded payments by their state. In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit’s holding that Congress 
intended to confer a private right to foster care maintenance payments specifically enumerated 
within the Child Welfare Act that is enforceable under section 1983 is correct. Therefore, the 
Court needs to protect those intended to be benefitted, and interpret the Act as establishing a 
right for foster care institutions and foster families to entitlement of the payments that they are 
owed. 
 
